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Abstract— The Privacy by Design approach to systems 
engineering introduces privacy requirements in the early stages 
of development, instead of patching up a built system afterwards. 
However, 'vague', 'disconnected from technology', or 
'aspirational' are some terms employed nowadays to refer to the 
privacy principles which must lead the development process. 
Although privacy has become a first-class citizen in the realm of 
non-functional requirements and some methodological 
frameworks help developers by providing design guidance, 
software engineers often miss a solid reference detailing which 
specific, technical requirements they must abide by, and a 
systematic methodology to follow. In this position paper, we look 
into a domain that has already successfully tackled these 
problems -web accessibility-, and propose translating their 
findings into the realm of privacy requirements engineering, 
analyzing as well the gaps not yet covered by current privacy 
initiatives. 
Index Terms— Privacy Requirements, Requirement 
decomposition, Privacy principles, Privacy patterns, Privacy by 
Design 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The term Privacy by Design (PbD) designates a software 
design approach that incorporates privacy requirements from 
the beginning and throughout the software development 
process, instead of considering them as an afterthought. The 
term was originally incepted by the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, Ann Cavoukian, whose 
definition includes a set of 7 foundational principles [1] that 
should guide the development of systems to mitigate privacy 
concerns from the very beginning. PbD has rapidly become a 
hot topic in the privacy realm. In 2010, it was recognized as an 
essential component of privacy and data protection by Privacy 
Commissioners from around the world [2], and has been 
introduced in recommended practices and regulations since 
then by both the US and the EU, among others. 
However, engineering Privacy by Design has demonstrated 
to be a tough task. Most criticisms come from the technical 
side, arguing that Cavoukian's principles are "disconnected 
from technology'' [3], "remain vague and leave many open 
questions about their applications when engineering systems'" 
[4], and "are more aspirational than practical or operationaF 
[5]. Besides, although Cavoukian and her team have published 
several documents to operationalize PbD [6] in some specific 
contexts, "she makes little effort to systematize or even 
summarize the design principles found' [5]. Further, legal or 
normative privacy principles are also far from technology, and 
moving them into technical requirements is not an easy job. IT 
practitioners willing to implement PbD cannot find a structured 
corpus of requirements, and get instead often lost in questions 
such as what they should do, or how they should do it. 
Cavoukian herself has recognized that "The next stage of PbD 
evolution is to translate its "7 Foundational Principles" into 
more prescriptive requirements, specifications, standards, best 
practices, and operational-performance criteria" [7]. 
From our experience, these problems have already been 
tackled in other technical domains which show structural 
similarities to privacy, for example, accessibility -the 
availability of a product or service to be used by all the people, 
disregarding the abilities or disabilities they might have. 
Privacy and accessibility share many commonalities: they are 
categories of non-functional requirements; more specifically, 
they are quality-in-use attributes whose determination depends 
on the specific user and context of use. Besides, they involve 
complex and interdisciplinary issues: both impact the users' 
rights and are thus contemplated by legislation in most 
countries are by corporate social responsibility frameworks. 
Therefore, we propose reviewing the current status of practice 
in accessibility requirements and examining whether some of 
the initiatives in this realm can be ported to privacy 
requirements engineering. 
II. REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING IN ACCESSIBILITY 
Most of the work on the definition of web accessibility 
requirements currently revolves around the W3C's Web 
Accessibility Initiative (WAI): a multi-stakeholder initiative, 
developing guidelines, strategies, and resources for web 
accessibility since 1997. More than 200 people from around the 
world, representing different industries and stakeholders, are 
active participants; to which thousands of external commenters 
should be accrued. 
The success of W3C WAI can be measured by the adoption 
of their guidelines among regulations and policies worldwide: 
it has set the accessibility standards required in many countries 
[8], has been endorsed by ISO, and is directly included by 
reference by the most recent regulations for public 
procurements in both the US and the EU. That is, fragmented 
regulations have converged to embrace WAI guidelines as the 
measuring rod for web accessibility, resulting on legal 
homogenization. Besides, the application field of WAI 
guidelines has been extended beyond its initial scope. Despite 
initially derived from global principles which could be 
applicable to any product or service, WAI focused only on the 
specific field of web technologies. However, its 
recommendations have now extended to deal with other ICT 
products and inspire guidelines by operating system vendors. 
A. Roles and Requirements 
W3C WAI has defined a framework consisting of several 
components that intervene in providing an accessible 
experience to the end user. These encompass both human 
components (the end users themselves and the producers or 
developers) and technical components, for each of which W3C 
WAI defines a family of accessibility requirements: 
Web contents, encompassing fully-fledged applications as 
well, which must abide by the Web Content Accessibility 
Guidelines (WCAG) to be accessible. 
Authoring tools that mediate between the producers and 
the web contents. 
User agents that mediate between the web contents and the 
end users. 
Assistive technologies, which users with disabilities lay 
over the user agents to decorate them with accessibility-
specific functions. 
Evaluation tools that developers (ought to) use to assess 
conformance with accessibility requirements. 
Technical specifications that define the interactions 
between all those. 
B. Requirement Layers and Conformance 
Accessibility requirements specified by WCAG are 
structured into four layers, each refining the previous one: 
foundational principles, basic guidelines, testable success 
criteria, and a rich collection of techniques to meet them [9], 
[10] in different contexts (Fig. 1). WCAG also establishes a 
conformance framework around these layers to assess whether 
and how accessible a system is. 
A principle defines the foundations necessary for anyone to 
access and use a system. Four principles are defined: 1) 
Perceivable, 2) Operable, 3) Understandable, 4) Robust. 
A guideline provides the specific goals that authors should 
work towards in order to meet a principle. Each principle can 
be decomposed into a fixed set of guidelines. The guidelines 
are not testable as they are defined, but refine the principles 
with specific objectives, and provide a structured framework to 
better understand the lower layers. WCAG defines 12 
guidelines in total, e.g. the Perceivable principle is composed 
by 4 guidelines, respectively dealing with: 1.1) Text 
alternatives, 1.2) Time-based media; 1.3) Adaptable content; 
and 1.4) Distinguishable content. 
A success criterion is an observable (by the system user) 
and measurable item (a checkpoint). For each guideline a set of 
objectively testable success criteria are provided. Objectivity 
does not necessarily imply automation: many success criteria 
may need human judgment for validation. Each success 
criterion is written as a technology-neutral statement that will 
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Fig. 1. Layers of guidance in accessibility requirements engineering. 
be either true or false for a specific web content. For example, 
regarding the guideline 1.1 (Text alternatives) a success 
criterion is defined as 1.1.1) "All non-text content that is 
presented to the user has a text alternative that serves the 
equivalent purpose, except for the situations listed below [...]". 
A technique is a reliable, implementable way to meet one 
or more success criteria. Each technique sanctioned by WAI is 
developed into a short document (usually a few pages), 
including applicability constraints, a detailed description, usage 
examples, external references, related techniques, and test 
procedures. Hundreds of techniques exist, covering a broad 
variety of cases. Regarding technology, "generic techniques" 
apply to any system, while "technology-specific techniques" 
only apply where the respective technology is used (e.g. 
HTML, Adobe Flash, etc.) Regarding conformance: a 
"sufficient technique" ensures conformance with the respective 
success criteria when it is applied (yet it is never necessary, as 
there may be different techniques to satisfy the same success 
criterion); an "advisory technique" does not directly provide 
conformance but helps attaining or going beyond it; finally, if a 
"failure technique" is not circumvented, some success criteria 
will be irremissibly failed. And regarding applicability, some 
techniques can be applied to any content, while others apply 
only in very specific contexts (e.g. emoticons, talking heads). 
WAI techniques are deemed as informative (optional), instead 
of normative (mandatory); however, they have proved to be 
quite useful as an off-the-shelf resource available to developers, 
who do not need to come up with their own techniques. 
Following our previous example, in order to meet the success 
criterion 1.1.1, technique H37 establishes that, when a short 
description can serve the same purpose and present the same 
information as the non-text content, for each HTML img 
element, the author must specify a short text alternative using 
the a l t attribute. 
A test case is an atomic test, usually one that is a partial test 
for a requirement [11], which defines the applicability criteria 
(elements of the system where the test is applied), the test 
procedure, and the expected results. Following on our previous 
example, a test case could be implemented using XPath 
expressions to automatically check whether all img elements in 
an HTML document include an a l t attribute with a short text. 
Test cases are not standardized (hence they are shown in gray 
in Fig. 1) and they are usually internally defined by specific 
testing frameworks and tools. Nonetheless, there have been 
some attempts beyond WAI to provide standardized tests and it 
is currently an area of work. 
Each success criterion has a Level of Conformance (i.e. 
relevance): A (most relevant), AA, and AAA (not so relevant). 
Depending on which success criteria a system satisfies, it may 
respectively hold one of three levels of conformance: Level A 
(minimum) implies satisfying all the Level A success criteria, 
Level AA implies satisfying both Level A and Level AA 
success criteria, and Level AAA implies satisfying Level AAA 
success criteria in addition. That is, conformance is defined in a 
most restrictive fashion: if any part of a system (e.g. a single 
icon) fails a single success criteria for some level X, the 
system does not conform to that level X. This has important 
consequences for the assessment of web accessibility: 
conformance can only be measured as an ordinal level (A, AA, 
AAA) and a system cannot be merely "60% accessible". 
III. SYSTEMATIZING PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING 
As we have advanced earlier, our position statement can be 
summarized as follows: the approach followed by the 
accessibility community to agree on a structured set of 
requirements can be translated into the privacy realm, thus 
defining the path to move from privacy principles to detailed, 
engineering requirements. This position is based on the 
similarities between both presented in the introduction. 
Mirroring the approach followed in the accessibility realm 
would imply: 
• Gathering stakeholders from different communities in an 
open, neutral forum, encompassing software and service 
developers, product and service providers, data protection 
authorities, digital rights associations, government 
agencies, policy makers, end-user communities, and 
researchers; where they may agree on a shared set of 
principles from which further requirements are refined. 
• Defining a collection of roles that are involved in the 
provision of privacy-compliant services and assigning 
privacy requirements to one or more of these roles. 
• Structuring privacy requirements into a series of layers, 
each refining the previous one into more detailed 
requirements: principles which define the foundations 
necessary for a system to be privacy-respectful, guidelines 
which provide the specific goals that authors should work 
toward in order to meet a principle, success criteria which 
define observable, testable and measurable items 
(checkpoints) for each guideline, and techniques which 
define a reliable, implementable way to meet several 
success criteria. 
• Providing an evolving catalogue of privacy patterns or 
techniques, including both technology-neutral and 
technology-specific patterns, which instruct engineers on 
the specific ways to meet privacy requirements, who can 
resort to this catalogue to choose the most appropriate 
techniques. 
• Defining levels of relevance of privacy requirements at the 
success criteria layer, so that different levels of compliance 
with the standardized body of requirements can be 
required, targeted, claimed, and certified. 
Next we are discussing how existent standardization 
initiatives could be accommodated to translate these ideas into 
the privacy realm, up to which point they might fit, and which 
elements are currently missing. 
A. Privacy Principles 
The concept of abstract principles is not exotic to the 
privacy realm. Although different sets of privacy principles 
have long been defined by different organizations, most of 
them source from data protection laws, which set the domain 
rules applicable to systems and software. Among the most 
relevant, we encounter [12]: the Fair Information Principles 
originally recorded in 1973 and later expanded in the OECD 
guidelines, which have inspired much subsequent legislation; 
the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and the new 
General Data Protection Regulation proposal, together with the 
Safe Harbor principles; the US Federal Trade Commission's 
Fair Information Practice Principles; and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation's Privacy Framework. 
Some standardization bodies have started to work on 
compiling and abstracting a homogeneous set of principles 
from those above mentioned and others. We should remark the 
principles of ISO/EC 29100 [13] and OASIS Privacy 
Management Reference Model and Methodology (PMRM) 
[14], based on previous work by the International Security, 
Trust and Privacy Alliance (ISTPA). These principles are 
indeed closer to the technical domain e.g. data minimization, 
use limitation, consent and choice. 
On the other hand, Cavoukian's PbD seven foundational 
principles provide an intermediate approach: they are focused 
on the engineering process, rather than on legal requirements; 
yet they are rather abstract and mix system-oriented principles 
(e.g. "Privacy as the default setting", "Visibility and 
Transparency - Keep it Open") with design-process-oriented 
ones ^Privacy Embedded into Design"). 
Besides, some authors propose extending the current set of 
privacy principles, as they argue that they are not enough, 
either because they only focus on data protection while 
forgetting other types of privacy [12], or because they focus on 
procedural aspects while leaving aside structural issues which 
have a larger impact on consumer rights [15]. 
As we have seen, there are already several initiatives which 
state the principles that must be met by privacy-compliant 
systems. However, there is not yet a consensus on a closed list 
of principles: the work by ISTPA made a big step in compiling 
principles from elsewhere, and it has later been picked up by 
OASIS PMRM, yet there are still divergent works at PbD, ISO, 
the academia, etc. We are suggesting that a twofold agreement 
could be assumed, by one of these standardization forums 
accommodating the privacy community at large, and by the 
community assuming the results output by that body. 
B. Roles for Privacy 
The privacy community has recognized the need to identify 
the roles that participate in privacy-affecting interactions. For 
example, the OASIS PMRM requires identifying: 1) 
Participants who have operational privacy responsibilities in 
any stage of the lifecycle ^creating, managing, interacting 
with, or otherwise subject to personal information"), 2) Privacy 
Domains which are subject to the (physical or logical) control 
of the same owner, and 3) Systems that accomplish a specific 
function (collect, communicate, process, store or dispose 
Personal Information) within a Privacy Domain. This 
specification does not clearly define roles and their 
responsibilities, though it establishes the need to identify them. 
Other initiatives have gone beyond and defined the roles 
that usually take part; for example, the UK Data Protection Act 
and ISO/EC 29100 identify the following basic roles: 
• A Data Subject (or PII Principal in ISO terms), who is the 
natural person whom the data is about. Usually, 
individuals who cannot be identified or distinguished from 
others are not considered as data subjects. 
• A Data Controller (or PII Controller) which determines the 
purposes and means for processing the data. A data 
controller must be a natural or legal person, so it can be 
held accountable if required, and must ensure that any 
processing of personal data for which it is responsible 
complies with regulation. 
• A Data Processor (or PII Processor), who processes 
information on behalf of the Data Controller. 
In addition, the literature identifies different privacy 
stakeholders i.e. natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body that can affect, be affected by, or 
perceive themselves to be affected by a decision or activity 
related to data processing. For example, the Data Protection 
Act defines a Data Protection Authority as the independent 
legal authority that administers privacy rules within a country. 
We think these roles may well be the starting point to 
allocate privacy requirements, although it would be necessary 
to ensure first that the set of roles is complete. 
C. Structuring Privacy Requirements into Layers 
The idea of refining principles into lower-level, more 
detailed goals is not new to the privacy realm. As early as in 
2001, Langheinrich [16] proposed a decomposition of PbD 
principles into so-called guidelines, although they were only 
applied to a specific domain (ubiquitous systems). These days, 
there have been different attempts to refine privacy principles 
into more detailed points, which demonstrate our proposal fits 
within the current state of the technique, where gaps need to be 
nonetheless covered. 
The OASIS Privacy by Design Documentation for Software 
Engineers Technical Committee (PbD-SE) [17] is working on 
"the specification of a methodology to help engineers model 
and document Privacy by Design (PbD) requirements, 
translate the principles to conformance requirements within 
software engineering tasks, and produce artifacts as evidence 
of PbD-principle compliance". PbD-SE, chaired by Cavoukian 
herself, splits PbD principles into sub-principles, and later into 
detailed conformance requirements. We agree with their 
consideration that better documented privacy requirements 
would enable software engineers in issuing proofs of normative 
judgments, privacy claims, and regulatory compliance, and 
their decomposition into a second layer of sub-principles could 
be quite useful for our goals. However, their lower layers are 
not aligned with our proposal, as PbD-SE conformance 
requirements focus quite much on the documentation process, 
instead of the final product requirements themselves. 
Cavoukian's Operationalizing Privacy by Design [6] refines 
each of the privacy principles into a set of actions and 
responsibilities, plus it compiles other documents published by 
her team as well, which contains detailed guidance. These 
documents are sometimes addressed to concrete roles (e.g. 
boards of Directors); some others deal with a focused goal or 
task (e.g. Governance, Risk Assessment); yet others focus on 
specific application domains (e.g. Health Care, Smart Grid) and 
technologies (e.g. Mobile Services, Wireless Communications, 
Big Data, Biometrics, RFID, Federated domains); and finally, 
some merely reflect best practice cases. As we see, they do not 
follow a systematic decomposition approach, but they mix up 
different levels. A clearer, systematic structuring would make 
much easier to trace requirements, decomposed through the 
different layers, and evaluate the completeness of a list of 
requirements. 
Different authors have defined hierarchies of privacy 
patterns that help move from legal principles to technical 
designs. High-level architectural patterns (e.g. minimization, 
enforcement) include Hoepman's strategies [18] and Kung's 
tactics [19]. In both cases, each architectural pattern is then 
refined into low-level design patterns i.e. a reusable solution to 
a recurrent privacy problem. These patterns describe the 
problem at stake, the context in which they can be applied, and 
the implementation of the solution, which might be a useful 
technique to refine more abstract requirements. 
The architectural patterns can be mapped onto one or more 
legal principles, some of which can only be fully covered with 
additional procedural and organizational means. The low-level 
design patterns are useful to streamline the design process, 
since they can be reused by developers (we will next revisit 
those, when dealing with techniques). However, they are not 
enough on their own, as they jump into the design without 
refining the requirements themselves. 
On the other hand, our proposal finds a paragon in existent 
non-functional requirement modeling frameworks. For 
instance, Yu and Cysneiros [20], employed i* to operationalize 
privacy requirements, moving from abstract requirements 
(softgoals), to concrete requirements (goals) and design 
solutions which operationalize these requirements (tasks). This 
approach also allows conjugating different definitions of 
privacy, from the perspectives of different agents playing 
different roles, so it seems quite promising to inspire the 
organization into requirement layers we propose. 
Fig. 2 summarizes the current landscape compared to our 
proposal: Although some existent proposals address the overall 
concept of decomposition, they usually mix up organizational 
and technical requirements altogether, without providing low 
level, specific technical requirements. Considered individually, 
they leave gaps in the decomposition process. However, a 
comprehensive set of requirements could be derived from all 
these and other sources, and then be structured according to our 
proposal. As a matter of example, under Cavoukian's principle 
of "Full Lifecycle Protection", a guideline for data processors 
would be to "Employ strong encryption by default along the 
different processes", a corresponding success criterion would 
read "encryption keys must be of sufficient length to resist 
breaking attempts and remain protected from access by 
unauthorized individuals", a general technique would match 
Hoepman's encryption design pattern, and a technology 
specific technique could be a technical mean to implement this 
pattern e.g. using Advanced Encryption Standard to encrypt all 
personal data. Of course, some purely legal requirements would 
not map to this decomposition, as they do not introduce 
technical requirements (e.g. registration of personal 
information repositories at data protection authorities). 
D. Technique Sources 
Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) is a widespread term 
to describe a set of measures, products, or services useful to 
improve one or several aspects of privacy protection, usually in 
specific contexts. This term groups disparate solutions, which 
are described at different levels of abstraction and focus on 
meeting different privacy principles. Thus, they do not help to 
refine the requirements but to meet them once they are stated. 
The lack of a systematic methodology to understand which 
PETs better fits with a given privacy requirement and context 
makes selecting one among them a difficult task. Hoepman 
[18] has tried to generalize and group PETs in privacy patterns. 
Likewise, the PriS method introduces process patterns to 
satisfy privacy goals that can be tailored according to 
organizational goals (functional requirements), which have 
been successively decomposed into a hierarchy of subgoals 
[21]. However, there is no current agreement on the way to 
describe privacy patterns, the level of abstraction they should 
provide, or how to choose among them. The PRIPARE project 
(http://pripare.eu/) is defining a privacy pattern template which 
may help homogenize the descriptions, in order to collect and 
classify them so as to create a privacy pattern repository that 
will help to choose the right pattern to meet specific privacy 
requirements, thus contributing to refine privacy requirements. 
On a different perspective, the OASIS PMRM, ISO/IEC 
29101 and the NIST Privacy Controls define a set of privacy 
services that every system should include as part of their 
privacy architecture. For example, the OASIS PMRM 
identifies 8 privacy services logically grouped into Core Policy, 
Privacy Assurance, and Presentation and Lifecycle services. 
The PMRM methodology proposes conducting a detailed use 
case analysis to identify the privacy requirements, and then use 
the privacy services to meet them. However, there is neither 
guidance on the requirements to be met (but merely high level 
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E. Levels of Conformance 
The concept of different levels of privacy protection is 
already adopted by different legislations, which usually attach 
it to different degrees of sensitivity of personal information: 
different types of personal information require different 
measures (e.g. UK Data Protection Act, Australian Data 
Privacy Act as amended, Spanish regulations in force 
according to the Personal Data Protection Law, US Department 
of Homeland Security Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive 
Personally Identifiable Information). Following our proposal, 
these different measures would be mapped to different subsets 
of success criteria, each assigned to a respective level of 
conformance. 
In addition, a clear definition of levels of conformance 
would enrich two trends in the state of practice in privacy 
assessment: privacy seals and privacy level agreements. 
A privacy seal is the outcome of a certification procedure 
regarding the privacy compliance of processes, technologies, 
products and services. It usually includes the evaluation of 
legal and, very few times, technical standards. As conclude by 
Rodrigues et al. [22], who comprehensively inventoried and 
analyzed 25 privacy and related certification schemes in 
Europe and at the international level, the privacy seals 
landscape is heterogeneous since there is a large degree of 
variation around the core functional models of seals schemes, 
the features they check, the level of guarantees to individuals, 
etc. Clearly defined levels of conformance could help this 
plethora of, sometimes incompatible, privacy seals converge to 
a compatible set, albeit possibly including different levels of 
certifications (different seal requirements). 
A privacy level agreement (PLA) [23] addresses the level 
of privacy protection a service provider commits to undertake 
and maintain -they represent the privacy-specific part of a 
Service Level Agreement (SLA). A PLA answers a lengthy, 
standardized set of questions, detailing policies and measures 
the service provider declares to put in practice. Thus, it 
represents an effective way for service providers to 
communicate to their customers the level of data protection 
they may expect. However, the large amount of details it 
provides may lead to a great variance which may eventually 
disorient customers. If these PL As were supplemented by an 
assignment to one of a set of levels, they would be perceived 
much clearer to customers. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have introduced five conditions that should be met in 
order to map the requirements framework used in accessibility 
onto the privacy realm. In most cases, these could rely on the 
state of the art, by taking further steps to restructure the 
existing work or filling the currently uncovered gaps. However, 
there is a key point that goes beyond the technical aspects: the 
need for a common standardization forum, agreed among all 
the stakeholders, which could issue standards accepted by all of 
them. We think OASIS is in good position to assume that role, 
yet further convergence is still needed with the community 
outside, and among their own working groups. 
Fig. 2. Different approaches for privacy requirements decomposition. 
Adopting such a framework would be of much use, as the 
success of WAI for accessibility has already proven. 
Certification mechanisms would flourish based on that 
common framework. A consensus on requirements could even 
impact regulations worldwide, by homogenizing them. Besides, 
a proper definition of requirements for a limited domain could 
eventually be extended to any other scenario. 
Nonetheless, nobody says this is a seamless task. A major, 
philosophical difference exists between accessibility and 
privacy: the former is just a matter of Human-Computer 
Interaction, while the latter is a Socio-Technical Systems issue 
[24], where different social entities interact with each other and 
with technical subsystems, and these interactions cannot be 
reduced to mere computing system issues. This has 
implications for our framework: requirements for each role 
would not probably be so clearly separated, and assessment 
from a mere user perspective would be difficult -there is not a 
single input-output user port anymore, but several entities 
interacting with the system in the back-office. Another 
drawback is the different meaning attached to privacy around 
the world. While we recognize that an agreement on privacy 
basics within the community is needed, we also consider how 
the original differences between different approaches to 
accessibility (e.g. barrier removal and closed assistive 
technologies versus universal design) were reconciled while 
trying reaching a common requirement corpus -a successful 
experience that we precisely aim at translating. 
In any case, the advantages seem to compensate for the 
potential drawbacks, and we consider this idea could deserve 
further study, with any needed adaptations to the privacy realm, 
to ease the tasks in privacy requirements engineering. 
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